International Lawyer
Volume 3

Number 2

Article 15

1969

Memorandum of Opinion
Nicholas J. Bua

Recommended Citation
Nicholas J. Bua, Memorandum of Opinion, 3 INT'L L. 397 (1969)
https://scholar.smu.edu/til/vol3/iss2/15

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in International Lawyer by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please
visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

NICHOLAS J. BUA*

Memorandum of Opinion
This action seeks damages for the death of FRANK BURDELL
resulting from the crash of defendant Canadian Pacific's Flight 402
while enroute from Hong Kong to Tokyo, Japan, on March 4, 1966.
Canadian Pacific has filed its motion to dismiss the suit upon the
grounds that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter and
alternatively because of improper venue in this court.
Defendant, Canadian Pacific Airlines, contends that the flight in
question was an international flight governed by the provisions of the
Warsaw Convention to which that defendant is a Contracting Party.
At the time of his death, the decedent was the District
Representative for the Far East for the Hyster Company of Peoria,
Illinois. He had held that position since 1961, and Mr. Burdell and his
family had lived in Singapore during this employment. The address of
the decedent at the time of death was 3 Chatsworth Avenue, Singapore.
However, Mr. Burdell and his family were citizens of the United States,
and citizens of the State of Illinois.
The ticket, which constitutes the contract of carriage, discloses
that Mr. Burdell had made arrangements to fly from Singapore to
Bangkok, Thailand on Cathay Pacific Airways on February 28, 1966;
on March 1, he flew from Bangkok to Hong Kong on Cathay Pacific; on
March 4, 1966, he flew from Hong Kong to Tokyo on Canadian Pacific
Airlines; and he left open the date for a flight on Cathay Pacific
Airways from Tokyo to Hong Kong and thence back to Singapore.
It is undisputed that Canadian Pacific Airlines does business in the
State of Illinois, and would be subject, in personam, to the jurisdiction
of this court, except that this defendant airline has raised Article 28 of
the Warsaw Treaty.
*The International Lawyer is pleased to reproduce the full text of the decisions of
Judge Nicholas J. Bua of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois rendered on November 7, 1968 holding certain provisions of the Warsaw Convention unconstitutional.
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Canadian Pacific contends in its brief that the Warsaw Convention
(The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Transportation by Air) is a treaty of the United States
and as such, it is the supreme law of the land and must be adhered to
by the courts of the State of Illinois.
Furthermore, Canadian Pacific asserts in its brief that the Warsaw
Convention establishes four forums in which an action based thereon
may be brought, namely, (1) the domicile of the carrier, (2) the
principal place of business of the carrier, (3) the carrier's place of
business through which the contract of carriage was made, or (4) the
place of destination. As applied to this litigation, Canadian Pacific
contends neither the State of Illinois nor the United States constitutes a
proper forum under the Warsaw Convention, and therefore, the courts
of the State of Illinois lack jurisdiction and constitute an improper
venue for this litigation.
Canadian Pacific refers to Article VI of the United States
Constitution, which states;
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding."
Although Canadian Pacific in its reply brief states that it has not
pleaded the limitation of liability under Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention Treaty, and that this motion does not concern the limitation,
its original brief referred to these provisions, and stated, in substance,
that the limitation provisions must be followed, even though the
limitation is substantially less than the wrongful death damages which
would otherwise be awarded. Canadian Pacific concludes that "this
court is bound to follow the provisions of the Warsaw Convention, if
it is applicable to this litigation, even though this convention is shown
to be contrary to the constitution, statutes, or court decisions of the
State of Illinois.
It is apparent and the court is not blind to the fact that underlying
this litigation is the defense that the damage limitations of the Warsaw
Convention apply to this case and limit the widow and children of the
decedent to $8,291.
The Court has considered the extensive, learned and very thorough
briefs submitted by the parties. The Court has drawn from these briefs
in this opinion.
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The Court finds that the ticket involved in this case contains the
same "Lilliputian" printing as the ticket involved in Lisi v. Alitalia
Airlines, 253 F.Supp. 237, afftd. 370 F. 2d 508. This decision was
affirmed without opinion by the United States Supreme Court, 390
U.S. 455; rehearing denied 391 U.S. 929.
The Court finds that the venue provisions of the Warsaw Treaty
which restrict the place of suit, in fact and realistically exclude or limit
a carrier's liability. The Court finds, under the authority of Lisi v.
Alitalia Airlines, 253 F.Supp. 237, affd. 370 F. 2d 508, and cases cited
therein, that restricting these American and Illinois citizens to the
institution of suits in Singapore, Hong Kong or Canada would exclude
or limit the air carrier's liability. Canadian Pacific failed to comply with
the Warsaw Convention requirements with respect to the ticket. This
Court refers to the language of United States District Judge Lloyd
MacMahon of the New York Federal Court, who, in his opinion, in Lisi,
253 F.Supp. 237, stated:
We hold, therefore, that compliance with the Convention
requires not merely physical delivery of a ticket and check before
departure but delivery of a ticket and check which notify the passenger
that the provisions of the Convention which exclude or limit liability
are applicable. Cf. Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc. 341 F.2d 851 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965); Warren v. Flying Tiger Line,
Inc., 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965); Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air
France, 229 F.Supp.801, 808 (N.D.Ga. 1964); Sand, Air Carriers'
Limitation of Liability and Air Passengers' Accident Compensation
under the Warsaw Convention, 28 J. Air L. & Com.260, 262-63
(1962). Thus, if the tickets and checks issued here did not so notify the
passenger, the challenged affirmative defenses are unavailable and must
be dismissed.
Judge MacMahon was affirmed through the United States Court of
Appeals and through the United States Supreme Court. In his opinion,
Judge MacMahon stated further:
We are of the opinion that a jury could not reasonably find that
the passenger tickets and baggage checks delivered here notified the
passengers that the exclusion or limitation provisions of the Convention
were applicable, and, accordingly, hold as a matter of law that
defendant cannot exclude or limit its libility under the Convention in
the case at bar. We think one look at the tickets and checks, which were
combined in the form of small printed booklets, compels this
conclusion.
International Lawyer, Vol. 3, No. 2
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The footnotes printed in microscopic type at the bottom of the
outside front cover and coupons, as well as condition 2(a) camouflaged
in Lilliputian print in a thicket of Conditions of Contract crowded on
page 4, are both unnoticeable and unreadable. Indeed, the exculpatory
statements on which defendant relies are virtually invisible. They are
ineffectively positioned, diminutively sized, and unemphasized by bold
face type, contrasting color, or anything else. The simple truth is that
they are so artfully camouflaged that their presence is concealed.
Lilliputian typography, Eck. v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 20
AppJDiv. 2d 454, 457 n.2, 247 N.YS. 2d 820, 824, rev'd on other
grounds, 15 N.Y.2d 53,255 N.Y.S. 249,203 N.E.2d 640 (1964), 'aff'd,
352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965), is at war with the intent of the
Convention. This was recognized by our Court of Appeals in Mertens
where one of the reasons for precluding the carrier from limiting its
liability under the Convention was that the required statement was
printed in such a manner as to virtually be unnoticeable and
unreadable.... Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., supra at 857.
We hold, therefore, that defendant failed to comply with Articles
3(l)(e) and 4(3)(h) of the Warsaw Convention and that the challenged
affirmative defenses are unavailable to defendant in these actions.

The United States Court of Appeals affirmed Judge MacMahon's
decision, stating:
It is clear, however, that under other Articles of the Convention,
these limitations on liability are not applicable if the carrier fails to
deliver to the passenger a ticket or a check for baggage. These Articles,
moreover, provide that the ticket and check shall contain certain
specified information, including a statement that the transportation is
subject to the rules relating to liability established by this convention.
Thus, it would appear, that unless the carrier furnishes to the passenger
a ticket or baggage check containing the appropriate statement, it may
not restrict its liability as circumscribed by the Convention Articles.

The Court finds that the venue provisions of the Warsaw
Convention are inapplicable to this case.
II
The Court finds that the origin of the decedent's air traffic ticket
was Singapore, and that his destination likewise was Singapore. The
Court also finds that Singapore was not a High Contracting Party at the
time the ticket was purchased or at the time of the accident.
International transportation is defined as:
...any transportation in which, according to the contract made
by the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination,
whether or not there be a break in the transportation or transshipment,
are situated within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or
International Lawyer, Vol. 3 No. 2

Opinion of JudgeBua

401

within the territory of a single High Contacting Party, if there is an
agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty,
suzerainty, mandate or authority of another power, even though that
power is not a party to this convention." Warsaw Convention, Article 1.
In Hjalsted, The Air Carrier's Liability in Cases of Unknown Cause
of Damage in International Air Law, 27 Journal of Air Law and
Commerce, p. 1, 4, the author states:
International carriage is, for the purposes of the Convention, any
carriage in which, according to the agreement between the parties, the
places of departure and destination are situated within the territory of
two Contracting States, or within the territory of one Contracting State
if there is an agreed stopping place within the territory of another
State, be it or not a Contracting State. A carriage to be performed by
several successive air carriers is deemed to be one undivided carriage, if
it has been regarded by the parties as a single operation, whether it had
been agreed upon under the form of a single contract or a series of
contracts.
The Court concludes, from an analysis of case law on the subject,
that the destination is determined not by the flight which comprises
part of the trip, but by the entire contract of carriage.
Canadian Pacific in its brief has stated:
The flight plan lists the point of departure and the point of
arrival both as Singapore. However, this defendant respectfully submits
that such a procedure was followed merely for the convenience of the
customer, and does not truly represent what actually occurred. Mr.
Burdell eventually would return to Singapore, since that was where he
resided and where he centered his business. However, the flight plan,
when considered in the light of the purpose therefor, was a series of
independent flights which were arranged for his convenience at one
time by a carrier in Singapore with whom he did a good deal of
business. As a consequence of these factual considerations, the
'contract made by the parties,' referred to in Article 1(2), is the
contract of carriage between Canadian Pacific Airlines and Mr. Burdell
from Hong Kong to Tokyo, and not the total flight plan so arranged for
Mr. Burdell by Cathay Pacific.
However, the Court notes that in one of the Affidavits filed by
defendant airline, it pleaded that "the origin of Mr. Burdell's air traffic
ticket was Singapore"; and that "the destination of Mr. Burdell's air
traffic ticket was Singapore."
Furthermore, defendant airline pleaded herein initially that:
(a) This defendant is incorporated under the laws of Canada;
(b) The defendant's principal place of business is in the City of
Montreal, Province of Quebec, Canada;
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 3 No. 2
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(c)
(d)

The contract of carriage in this case was made in Singapore;
The place of destination of said flight was Singapore.

It is clear, therefore, from the express statement on the ticket, the
pleadings in this case, and the applicable case law, that Singapore was
the destination as well as the place of origin within the meaning of the
Warsaw Convention.
Article 38 of the Warsaw Convention Treaty provides:
The adherence shall be effected by a notification addressed to the
Government of the Republic of Poland, which shall inform the Government of each of the High Contracting Parties thereof.
The adherence shall take effect as from the ninetieth day after the
notification made to the Government of the Republic of Poland.
In its brief, Canadian Pacific attached a letter from the United
States Department of State, wherein the Deputy Legal Adviser stated
that he considers Singapore to be an adherent to the Warsaw
Convention. However, an official publication compiled by the Treaty
Affairs Staff, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, lists
treaties on record in the Department of State on January 1, 1967.
States which are parties to the Warsaw Convention are listed on pages
235 and 236. Singapore is not among the 93 nations listed although
Singapore is listed as a party to other treaties in this publication.
But of even more significance is a letter filed in this proceeding
from the Government of Poland, signed by Dr. J. Osiecki, Vice-Director
of Legal and Treaty Department, which is dated February 19, 1968,
and reads as follows:
Dear Sir:
In reply to your letter of November 27, 1967 directed to the
Polish Government and concerning the participation of Singapore in
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, I
would like to inform you that the Polish Government has not received
the notification of adherence from Government of Singapore since it
became an independent State to the above mentioned Convention.
At the same time I can only inform you that on 6 November 1967
the Government of Singapore deposited with the Government of
Poland the instrument of adherence bySingapore to the Protocol
amending the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating
to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929,
done at the Hague on 28 September 1955. In accordance with
paragraph 3 of Article XXIII of the Hague Protocol it entered into
force for Singapore on 4 February 1968.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 3 No. 2
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In Aviation Law Reports, No. 408, of March 6, 1967, dated two
years after Singapore became an independent sovereign state, the
Convention parties are listed, but Singapore is not listed.
In conclusion, this Court finds that Singapore became an
independent Republic of Southeast Asia, a member of the Commonwealth of nations, and an independent sovereign state in 1965, and that
Singapore, as of the time of the purchase of the tickets and the time of
the occurrence, had not adhered to or ratified the Warsaw Convention.
The Court refers to authorities cited in plaintiffs' brief, including
D. P. O'Connell, "Independence and Succession of Treaties," 38 Brit.
Year Book of Intl. Law 84, at page 143:
No international authority has decided that the Warsaw Convention is automatically applicable in territories which belong to a
contracting State before independence, or with respect to international
carriage by air after independence.
Article 40 of the Convention states that "any High Contracting
Party may bind a colony or protectorate territory." However, Singapore became a completely independent sovereign state in 1965, prior to
the occurrence, and it is clear that it did not deposit an instrument of
adherence with the Government of Poland until November 6, 1967.
The Court refers to Jones, "State Succession in the Matter of Treaties,"
24 Brit. Year Book of Intl. Law 360, at page 366:
DISMEMBERMENT AND SECESSION.
A new state is formed by secession from the mother-country.
The obvious historical example is that of the United States. It was
never contended that the treaties made by Great Britain, even so far as
they related specifically to the American Colonies, applied to the
United States. Keith, Theory of State Succession (1907), page 19.
When a new State comes into existence, which formerly formed
part of an older State, its acceptance or otherwise of the treaty
relationships of the older State is a matter for the new State to
determine by expressed declaration or by conduct (in the case of each
individual treaty) as considerations of policies may require. Irish Free
States Debates, 11 July, 1933.
Plaintiffs assert that the Federation of Malaya never complied with
the requirements for adherence. Prior to achieving a complete independent sovereignty in 1965, the state or territory of Singapore was a part
of the Federation of Malaya. The Court finds that it is unnecessary to
determine whether or not the Federation of Malaya adhered to or
ratified the Warsaw Convention, because it is clear that the Government
of Singapore did not, and Singapore became an independent sovereign
state prior to the occurrence.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 3 No. 2
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Therefore, for this further reason, the Warsaw Convention is not
applicable to this case.
III
Even though the Court has found that the provisions of the
Warsaw Convention Treaty, in respect to venue or jurisdiction, are not
applicable for the reasons previously stated, the Court deems it
necessary to pass upon the validity of certain provisions of the Warsaw
Convention. This point was stressed particularly by the plaintiffs as an
alternative objection to the Motion to Dismiss, and the Court feels it
would be remiss if it did not pass upon these alternative arguments
which may now have relevance and most certainly will have relevance in
the future in this litigation.
At the outset the Court realizes the importance and significance of
this decision. Everyone is aware that international air travel is rapidly
increasing to the point where millions of United States citizens are or
will be flying in international air travel. In "Aerospace Facts and
Figures, 1968," published by Aero Publishers, Inc. in respect to
international air travel, this publication shows the following, at page
10S. (see facing page)
The Court takes notice of the fact that large jet transports which
may contain as high as 400 or more passengers are now being
flight-tested and will soon be operational in international air travel.
Canadian Pacific takes the position that any treaty is not subject
to constitutional restrictions. This Court does not agree.
In Treaties and Constitutional Law: Property Interferences and
Due Process of Law, by Willard B. Cowles, the author states that
treaties are subject to constitutional attack and in deciding constitutionality, the Courts should consider changed conditions.
Plaintiffs point out that "deprivations" or "takings" of property
(the essence of the terms used in the Fifth Amendment of
Constitution) are species of interferences therewith. When the due
process or just compensation clauses are raised in litigation it assumes
an "interference" with property, the litigated question being whether
the interference operated to "deprive" persons of property without due
process of law or to "take" property without assuring just compensation. (Omina Commercial Co. v. U. S., 261 U.S. 502, 510 (1923);
Eaton v. B. C. & M. R.R.Co., 51 N.H. 504, 511 (1872); O'Reilly de
Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45, 51 (1908); Fairmount Creamery Co. v.
Minn., 274 U.S. 1, 8 (1927); Bird et al. v. U. S. 24, F. 2d 933, 934
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 3 No. 2
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International Airline Passenger Service
Selected Calendar Years, 1926 to Date
Year
Ending
Dec. 31

Passengers
Carried
(Thousands)

Revenue
Passenger-Miles Flown
(Millions)

1926
1930
1935
1940
1945
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967

Not Available
33
111
163
511
1,752
2,140
2,391
2,745
2,919
3,488
4,068
4,259
4,428
4,999
5,499
5,699
6,598
7,513
8,775
10,195
11,646
13,424

Not Available
7.8
46.7
99.8
450.1
2,214.0
2,613.8
3,065.0
3,450.8
3,810.4
3,398.9
5,226.2
5,882.0
6,123.9
7,064.2
8,306.2
8,768.5
10,138.0
11,905.4
14,352.4
16,789.0
19,298.4
23,259.3

(C.C.A., 9th 1928); New York v. Eckerson, 133 A.D. 220, 223 (1909);
State v. Miksicek, 225 Mo. 561, 569 (1910)).
In Cochrane v. United States, 92 F.2d 623 (C.C.A. 7th, 1937),
cert.den. 303 U.S. 636 (1938), the court considered the constitutional
validity of a treaty concerning duck hunting. Although the court did
not declare the treaty unconstitutional, it again confirmed that validity
or invalidity of a treaty is essentially a question of "degree"-that is,
does the treaty infringe upon the rights of citizens "unreasonably and
arbitrarily?"
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The Court finds, as stated by the author Cowles, in "Treaties and
Constitutional Law," that the United States Constitution "is the real
supreme law of the land, and its prohibitions are binding in cases of
irreconcilable conflict with treaty stipulations, where the question is
properly raised .... Treaty stipulations and treaty implementing instruments must be, or be construed to be, consistent with the due process
and just compensation clauses of the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution or be held inoperative."
The Court has noted that various decisions have eroded the force
of the restrictive provisions of the Warsaw Convention, while not
squarely passing upon the validity of its restrictive provisions (Lisi v.
Alitalia Airlines, 370 F. 2d 508; Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, 341 F. 2d
851).
The Court finds that the Warsaw Convention Treaty, and any
treaty, is subject to the Constitution of the United States, and any
provision of a treaty which purports to take away a right of a citizen,
provided for by the Constitution, is invalid as to that citizen.
The Court refers to American Law Institute Restatement, Foreign
Relations Law (1965), Comment under Section 117(d), in which it is
stated: "The United States has the power under the Constitution to
make an international agreement if ... (b) the agreement does not
contravene any of the limitations of the Constitution applicable to all
powers of the United States."
Furthermore, this Restatement states: "No power granted to the
United States by the Constitution is unlimited-including the treaty
power. Notwithstanding the existence of an affirmative constitutional
power in the Federal Government to deal with a matter by international agreement, the Constitutional limitations upon action by the
Government may nevertheless prohibit the making of an agreement.
Such limitations as those contained in the Bill of Rights apply to action
taken under the grant of the power to make international agreements
just as to action taken under other grants of governmental power."
In 52 Am.Jur., Treaties, p. 809:
It is uniformly conceded that a treaty cannot be considered as the
law of the land within the meaning of the Federal Constitution, and as
such binding on the courts, if in making it the limits of the
treaty-making power have been exceeded. While there is no such
limitation as to subject matter on the treaty-making power as exists in
the case of the legislative power, nevertheless, the Federal power does
not extend to the making of treaties which change the Constitution or
which are inconsistent with our form of government, with the relations
of the states and the United States, or with the Federal Constitution.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 3, No. 2
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Story states in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the

United States (Vol. 2, p. 1508):
It (a treaty) is not to be construed as to destroy the fundamental
laws of the United States. A power given by the Constitution cannot be
construed to authorize a destruction of other powers given in the same
instrument.
It must be construed, therefore, in subordination to it, and cannot
supersede or interfere with any other of its fundamental provisions.
In Cooley, Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, p. 117:
The United States Constitution imposes no restriction upon
power of the President to make treaties with the concurrence
two-thirds of the Senate, but the treaty making power is subject to
restriction that nothing can be done under it which changes
Constitution.

the
of
the
the

The United States Supreme Court said in Cherokee v. United
States, 78 U.S. 616, 20 L.ed 227, 229:
It need hardly be said that a treaty cannot change the Constitution
or be held valid if it be in violation of that instrument. This results from
the natural and fundamental principles of our government.
In Dowling and Edwards, American Constitutional Law, at page
298, it is stated:
In the Supremacy Clause treaties made under the authority of the
United States are declared to be the supreme law of the land. The
Constitution contains no express limitation upon this power. The
Supreme Court has never held a treaty unconstitutional, despite
repeated and vigorous contentions to that effect in a variety of factural
matters. Does this indicate that the treaty power is without constitutional bounds? Or are there constitutional restraints; if so, how may
they be determined and defined?
At the outset a significant but often disregarded fact should be
noted; namely, that from its earliest decisions, the Court has consistently expressed its power of judicial review of treaties rather than
regarding them as so political in character as to be beyond Court
inquiry. The Court has said that the provisions of a treaty may not be
annulled or disregarded by the Courts 'unless they violate the
Constitution of the United States.' (Doe ex dem. Clark v. Braden, 16
How. 635, 657, 14 L.Ed. 1090 (1853)), and 'that a treaty cannot
change the Constitution or be held valid if it be in violation of that
instrument.' (The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall.616, 620, 20 L.Ed. 227
(1870)).
In Wheare, Federal Government (1947), at page 182, it is stated
that the treaty-making power cannot be contended to "extend so far as
to authorize what the Constitution forbids ....This surely means that
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 3, No. 2
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the treaty-making power is subordinate to, among other principles, such
rules as that of the 'Due Process Clause.'"
The Court refers to an article by Roger Lea MacBride entitled
"Treaties versus the Constitution," 26 Int'l. Law Pamphlets 17. In the
article, MacBride stated:
Another treaty which may contravene the United States Constitution is the Warsaw Convention, ratified in 1934. That multipartite
international treaty undertakes to regulate and limit rights of recovery
against international air carriers. In the debate in the Senate last
January (1955), Senator Butler posed this hypothetical case: Two men
take off from San Francisco, one bound for New York and the other
for London. The plane crashes on take-off. The man holding the ticket
for New York may recover damages to the extent that a jury finds he is
entitled to them; the man whose destination was London is limited by
the Warsaw Convention to a maximum of $8,300. Senator Kefauver,
having admitted that this was a correct interpretation of the treaty,
Senator Butler continued, 'In my opinion, it shows conclusively that we
have already, by treaty, cut across the right of the American people to a
full jury trial in the event of accident or death in a case such as that
stated.' Congressional Record, January 29, 1955 (Vol. 100, No.17), p.
971, unbound edition. See also Report of Standing Committee on
Peace and Law Through United Nations, ABA, Feb. 1, 1952, p. 16.
The then President of the American Bar Association, Frank E.
Holman, stated in reference to MacBride's article, "I have no hesitation
in saying that it is one of the best exposes of the danger of treaty law to
American rights and the American form of government that has yet
been written."
Preliminary to any decision, it is important to trace the history of
the Warsaw Convention Treaty, because the Court believes that it is its
duty to analyze the origin and creation of the restrictive venue and
monetary provisions. If these provisions of the Treaty are violative of
the United States Constitution, then this Court and any Court, must
declare such restrictive provisions of the Warsaw Convention Treaty
unconstitutional and invalid.
There does not appear to be any serious dispute but that the
Warsaw Convention was the result of two international conferences
held in Paris in 1925 and Warsaw in 1929, and of the work done by the
interim Comite International Technique d'Experts Juridique Aeriens
(CITEJA) created by the Paris Conference. Civil aviation at that time
was still in its infancy. The total airline operations in the five-year
period 1925 to 1929-in domestic as well as foreign travel-was only
400 million passenger miles. The fatality rate was 45 per 100 million
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 3, No. 2
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passenger miles. Plaintiffs point out that this compares with the rate of
0.55 fatalities per 100 million passenger miles in 1965 (1965 Annual
Report of the ICAO Council to the ICAO Assembly 13).
In that early period, it is obvious that airlines, especially in
international travel, constituted a fledgling industry to which the
Senate of the United States apparently desired to grant preferential
protection. Airlines carried a few passengers at cruising speeds of about
100 miles per hour and over stages of about 500 miles. This is in
marked contrast to the present day jet travel, in which over 13 million
passengers were carried in international travel in 1967, according to
"Aerospace Facts and Figures, 1968."
The Court has read an article in 80 Harvard Law Review 497,
entitled "The United States and the Warsaw Convention." In that
article it is stated:
The United States, which had not participated in the work of
z"TEJA and had sent only an observer to the Warsaw Conference,
.ved quickly thereafter. In November of 1933, the Commerce
Department wrote to the Secretary of State (Letter from E. Y.
Mitchell, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, to the Secretary of State,
Nov. 28, 1933-this letter and all the others referred to in this article,
can be found in the files of the General Counsel, Federal Aviation
Agency, Washington, D.C.):
The Aeronautics Branch has made a study of the
Treaty drafted and approved at Warsaw and has contacted a
number of air transportation operators on the subject. All
United States operators conducting international air transport services strongly favor adherence to the Convention by
the United States .... The Aeronautical Chamber of
Commerce of America, the Trade Association Organization
representing ninety percent of all United States transport
operators and one hundred percent of those operating
internationally, strongly favors participation in the Convention. No airline operating at the present time has
indicated opposition to adherence to the Convention by the
United States.
The State Department thereupon transmitted its approval to the
President, the President submitted the Treaty to the Senate, and on
June 15, 1934, without debate, committee hearing, or report, the
Senate gave its advice and consent by voice vote. (78 Cong.Rec.1 1,582
(1934) ). The United States deposited its instrument of adherence on
July 31, 1934, and the President proclaimed the Treaty ninety days
later (T.S. No. 876, 49 Stat. 3000 (1934) ). Thus, although the United
States had nothing to do with formulation of the convention and had
adhered rather than ratified, it was almost a charter member.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 3, No. 2
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Plaintiffs point out that in 1933- 34 economic conditions throughout the world were relatively severe and that at that time there was
virtually no international air transportation, except for a few short trips
between Paris and London, and similar flights not over 500 miles. The
Court has noted that in May of 1966, certain airline carriers entered
into an agreement providing for an increase of their liability to
$75,000. However, this increased liability would not apply to this case,
even if this occurrence took place after May of 1966, because this
so-called Montreal Interim Agreement applies only to international air
travel which has a contact with the United States.
The project of the Conference (II Conference International de
Droit Prive Aerien, 4-12 Octobre 1929, Varsovie 17 (1930) was
twofold. First, since aviation was obviously going to link many lands
with different languages, customs and legal systems, it was desirable to
establish at the outset a certain degree of uniformity. The Convention
achieved this almost completely as to documentation -tickets, waybills,
and the like (International Air Traffic Association (IATA) had prepared
standard documents which had been in use since 192 1, but their legal
effect was not certain: C. Shawcross & K. Beaumont, Air Law, § § 40
n.(e), 71 (2d ed. 1951) )-and to a degree as to the procedure for dealing
with claims arising out of international transportation and substantive
law applicable to such claims. Briefly, there was to be a two-year period
of limitation (Article 29), and only the carrier actually performing the
transportation was to be liable for damages caused in the course of the
transportation (Article 30 (2) ). (Warsaw Proceedings 226- 27). This
was the rule in respect to claims for damage to passengers. Jurisdiction
over a carrier was to be available where the carrier was "domiciled" or
had its principal place of business, where the carrier had a place of
business through which the contract was made, or at the place of
destination of the flight (Article 28).
Furthermore, the Warsaw Convention limited the liability of air
carriers to 125,000 "Poincare francs." This now amounts to $8,291. At
the time of the Warsaw Conference in 1929, the value of 125,000
Poincare francs was $4,898.
With this historical analysis in mind, the Court must determine the
validity of these restrictions of the Warsaw Convention, as applied to
this case, which involves the death of an executive, an American citizen,
engaged in travel in the Far East, who was killed due to the alleged
negligence of the defendant, Canadian Pacific Airlines.
In this case it appears to be undisputed that the decedent, Frank
W. Burdell, was 40 years of age at the time of his death and was earning
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approximately $15,000 per year; that he left surviving his widow, Lois
Arlene Burdell, age 32, and his children, Nickola Leigh Burdell Sexton,
age 18, James F. Burdell, age 9, and Paul D. Burdell, age 7, and that Mr.
Burdell was employed by The Hyster Company in Singapore, as a Far
Eastern Representative. It is obvious that the damages which resulted to
his family from his death are most substantial.
It also appears to be undisputed that Mr. Burdell was a passenger
in a jet airplane operated by defendant, Canadian Pacific Airlines.
Plaintiffs have alleged that upon arrival in the Tokyo area it circled
Tokyo for approximately one hour, due to the extremely thick fog and
obviously very hazardous conditions. The pilot told the control tower
at Tokyo airport that he would head for Taiwan. Nonetheless, he
attempted to land in the thick fog, and quickly turned into an approach
pattern over Tokyo Bay and headed down toward the runway. At the
end of the runway the plane rammed a seawall, somersaulted and
exploded into flames, killing its crew of ten and all but eight of its 62
passengers.
If defendant airline were correct, and if 125,000 Poincare francs
were now worth less than $1.00, then the courts would still be
powerless to declare such provisions unconstitutional. Furthermore, if
the venue provisions of the Warsaw Convention required the institution
and prosecution of all actions in Warsaw, Poland, for example,
defendant would likewise contend that this Court could not act.
The Court has considered the perceptive article in '68 Harvard
Law Review by Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, referred to by plaintiffs
in their brief and refers to the statistics therein: (see following page)
These authors state that:
Allowing for a reasonable margin of error in what were conceded
to be only estimates, the incremental insurance costs at various limits,
taken as a proportion of operating cost, were clearly somewhere
between the cost of the olive and the cost of the gin in the martini, and
nowhere near the cost of an inflight movie.
Furthermore, plaintiffs point out that the International Union of
Aviation Insurers in Montreal have stated that:
The truth is we just do not know what the premiums involved
would be, bearing in mind the individual nature of the insurance
contracts between the airlines and their insurers ....

In conclusion we

feel that the passenger legal liability coverage is a relatively small
proportion of the overall operating costs of an airline against its revenue
and that by and large far too much emphasis has been put upon the
aspect of insurance costs.
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Applicable
Year

Total
Settlements

Number of
Settlements

Average per
Passenger
Fatality

WARSAW
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954*
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
Totals

25
26
43
3
1
2
23
1
53
10
8
2
2
14
213

$

201,529
82,015
276,634
28,088

10,576
11,656
108,700
4,812
405,710
74,700
37,227
12,000
16,600
114,000
$ 1,382,247

$ 8,061
8,154
6,433
8,696
10,576
5,828
4,726
4,812
7,654
7,470
4,653
6,000
8,300
8,142
$ 6,489

NON-WARSAW
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954*
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
Totals

112
105
107
62
....
122
85
43
112
161
184
105
117
114
23
1,452

$ 1,327,385
1,506,764
2,493,165
2,362,910

$11,350
14,350
23,301
38,111

2,433,345
2,467,980
1,295,064
6,451,351
12,856,984
8,901,610
1,562,397
7,421,849
3,057,079
1,763,000

19,945
29,035
30,118
57,601
79,857
48,378
14,880
63,434
26,816
76652
$38,499

$55,900,883

* No judgments or settlements were reported for accidents occurring in 1954.
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The relevance of this statistical and other information is that the
preferential treatment accorded airlines has no economic, moral or legal
justification at the present time. Any reasons which ever existed for
such preferential treatment accorded airlines has not only disappeared,
but the contrary is now the fact.
Plaintiffs point out that in the American Bar Journal, Vol. 43,
page 412, (May 1957) Clifford W. Gardner, formerly President of the
Minnesota Bar Association, prescribed legal advice to lawyers and
judges in an article entitled, "So You're Going to Fly to London." This
article points out the alleged limitations imposed by the Warsaw
Convention. The author states: "From an airline's or an insurer of an
airline's point of view, I think this Treaty is the greatest writing since
the advent of paper money."
This Court believes that very few members of the public have been
aware of the severe monetary damage limitations of the Warsaw
Convention which would restrict the family of a father, husband and
wage-earner to $8,291, regardless of the degree of the true, uncontested, pecuniary losses.
The Court has considered the authorities cited by defendant
airline in its brief. No Court of appellate jurisdiction, state or federal,
has passed upon the constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention. The
first case cited by defendant airline, Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air
France, 229 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Ga. 1964), has, subsequent to the filing
of the airline's brief, been decided by the United States Court of
Appeals (386 F.2d 323). Certiorari was denied by the United States
Supreme Court. This case is not in point because it did not decide the
unconstitutionality of the Warsaw Convention Treaty.
The second case cited by defendant airline, Pierre v. Eastern Air
Lines, 152 F.Supp. 486 (D.N.J. 1957), was a decision of a United
States District Judge. Apparently this case was not reviewed by a
Higher Court. This decision, in 1944, did not involve the points raised
in this case, and in the decision, the judge recognized the legal principle
that a treaty may be declared unconstitutional by a Court. The Court
agrees with the plaintiffs that this case, involving an accident more than
two decades later, involves different considerations than were presented
to the Court in 1944. The plaintiffs in this case raise contentions not
made in Pierre to the effect that the restrictive provisions of the Warsaw
Convention Treaty in respect to venue and damages violate the Fifth,
Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
The third case cited by defendant airline is Garcia v. Pan American
Airways, Inc. 269 App.Div. 287, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 317 (1945), aff d., 295
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N.Y. 852, 67 N.E.2d 257, cert.den. 329 U.S. 741. This case is also a
lower court opinion in which the points urged by the plaintiffs
apparently were not presented to that Court. That case, also decided in
1944, cited no authority.
The Court finds that the venue provisions and damage limitation
provisions of the Warsaw Convention Treaty are unconstitutional, as
applied to this case; that such provisions deny to the plaintiffs due
process and equal protection of law guaranteed to them by their
Constitution.
The Court finds that the Warsaw Convention Treaty provisions
which would restrict the right of the plaintiffs to bring this action
against defendant airline in a duly constituted court of the United
States which would otherwise have jurisdiction, are unconstitutional
and therefore, unenforceable.
The Court further finds that the provisions of the Warsaw
Convention Treaty which would restrict damages in this case to
approximately $8,300 are unconstitutional and therefore not enforceable because they violate the due process and equal protection clauses
of the United States Constitution. The Court finds that such provisions
are arbitrary, irresponsible, capricious and indefensible as applied to
this case, in that such provisions would attempt to impose a damage
limitation of considerably less than the undisputed pecuniary losses and
damages involved in this case. Such unjustifiable, preferential treatment
of airlines is unconstitutional. The Court finds that such preferential
discrimination to airlines does not apply to manufacturers or even to
the United States Government. As pointed out by the plaintiffs, this
could result in an absurd situation in which, in this case, Douglas
Aircraft Company, if liable under either the strict liability rule or
because of common law negligence, might be required to pay damages
of $591,700, if a verdict of a jury were $600,000. Canadian Pacific
Airlines, which might be considered much more negligent and at fault
than this defendant manufacturer, would be permitted to escape with
the nominal payment of approximately $8,300. The Government
enjoys no immunity or restriction of liability. Thus, in a similar
situation involving the Government as an additional defendant, the
United States Government would be required to pay damages similar,
comparatively, to that of the manufacturer. The Court considers that
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there is no basis for this unequal and discriminatory treatment of
common carrier airlines, engaged in international travel, and that there
is no legal or rational basis for this discriminatory treatment.
Accordingly, defendant airline's motion to dismiss is denied. Said
defendant is ordered to answer the complaint within twenty-eight days.
Enter:
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